PDF | On Jan 1, , Nirmala Mani Adhikary and others published Mahan Darshanik Kumarila Bhatta ra Bhatta-Mimamsa Darshanko Sankshipta Parichaya . Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, who likely flourished around ce, was a proponent of the orthodox Brahmanical school of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā. Among the. Title: A comparative study of the commentaries of Kumarila Bhatta and Prabhakara on Purva Mimamsa. Researcher: Kapoor, Veena. Guide(s): Vidyalankar, Jai.

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Among the most influential thinkers in the history of Indian philosophy, he made significant contributions kumaeila the full range of issues that follow from that school’s constitutive concern with Vedic authority and exegesis; virtually all Indian philosophers writing subsequent to him—and particularly Buddhist philosophers, whose positions were most completely antithetical to his—found it necessary to reckon especially with his arguments regarding epistemology and philosophy of language.

Among the areas in which he exercised lasting influence are hermeneutics, poetics, jurisprudence, and arguably historiography. Increasingly pressed by philosophically polyglot proponents of rival schools of thought, Indian philosophers at this time were in an unprecedentedly good position to work out the entailments of their various commitments, and philosophical traditions quickly developed in subtlety and sophistication from this point on.

This characterization of dharma can be taken to suggest that it consists chiefly in kumxrila realization of post-mortem existence, which was indeed among the expected results of certain Vedic rites.

See, on this idea, Clooney— While the arguments are in the service of claims such as that the Vedas are eternal that are unlikely to be attractive to modern kumarilw, this text is often a model of philosophical subtlety and sophistication. Determinately contentful linguistic cognitions that have not been falsified are reasonably taken, then, as bases for action. Accordingly, it must be ascertained that the arising of a cognition of a jar really is based on a jar only after ascertainment that there is a jar which really exists as the cause of that cognition, [which ascertainment can be] based only on perception of pragmatic efficacy.

What he refuses, however, is the claim that the cognition of pragmatic efficacy provides a fundamentally different kind of justification than the initial cognition. Confidence, to the contrary, that pragmatic efficacy does provide something more—that it tells us, e. Thus, to have some prima facie justified belief subsequently called into question just is for the subsequent cognition to present itself as having, phenomenologically, the force of overriding kumarrila preceding; if that is not how the second awareness seems, then its phenomenological content will not be that of bhafta overriding cognition in the first ukmarila, and it therefore will not present itself to the subject thereof as undermining any already-held belief.


In fact, this is already just what one is entitled to think in virtue of being justified, and it is hard to imagine what sense it could make kumaria think we might be, with respect to any particular belief, in a better epistemic position than already entitled to think it true.

Indeed, whether or not we are entitled to think the Vedas epistemically reliable is just the issue in question ; it would therefore be to little avail to ask how it is simply that cognitions already known to be reliable have the status they do, since it must first be established that Vedic injunction is a rational basis for action in the first place.

Aptly expressing the reversed direction of epistemological explanation commended by this interpretation, William Alston kymarila asked to similar effect: Thus, to the extent that any linguistic episode reflects or expresses something of the epistemic perspective of a particular language-user, the claim it makes is always such as can be overridden based on considerations involving that limited epistemic perspective—based, e.

On this, see Krasser The problem he raises is that any particular linguistic act is intelligible as a linguistic act—intelligible, that is, as instituting linguistic policies—only given the prior understanding that the meaning-creating utterance itself means something. See, as well, Volosinov45— Many Brahmanical texts preserve, in this regard, a famous story of the significance of precise transmission of the text: The considerations here in play are not unlike those that preoccupied Husserl in his On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time ; just, then, as Husserl was led to venture that the seemingly instantaneous present of consciousness kumariila somehow comprise something of the past and future if we are to account for things like the musical experience of melody, so, too, Sanskritic thinkers had wondered how to account for the dawning of bhatat relative to the necessarily temporal unfolding of any sentence one could encounter.

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa – Hindupedia, the Hindu Encyclopedia

At the moment, for example, when the last phoneme of a sentence is uttered, the initial phonemes are no longer present; at what point, then, are we to say that the sentence’s meaning is experienced, and how are we to account for that with regard to the necessarily vanished moments that are involved?


Insofar, that is, as we are prima facie justified in thinking of something perceived as being a cow really to be cow, and insofar as no overriding cognition is forthcoming, we are entitled to think the perceived fact of its being a cow is real.

According to a stock example, it must be supposed, of a corpulent person who never eats during the daytime, that he eats at night.

See Clooney, ff. This interpretation is advanced by Clooney, ff. Emphasizing, to similar effect, some profound intuitions that can be understood as reflected in the doctrine of the transcendence of the Vedas, J.

The text itself is primary and autonomous. Kumaila, then, not implausibly finds it possible to see a basically Gadamerian thought reflected in the idea of the Vedas as authorless, and thus to emphasize the character of these as representing a horizon for rather than a constraint on ethical thinking: Life, works, and influence 1.

Direct realism and the doctrine of immediate justification 2.

Metaphysics and philosophy of language 3. Edited by Kashinath Vasudev Abhyankar, et al,ff. University of Madras, Sri Satguru, reprint; first published in Calcutta, kumatila Motilal Banarsidass reprint; first published in Gaekwad’s Oriental Series, — Pilgrims Book reprint; first edition, Secondary literature Alston, William,Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious ExperienceIthaca: Arnold, Dan,Buddhists, Brahmins, and Belief: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office. Motilal Banarsidass second edition.

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa

Publications of the De-Nobili Research Library vol. Explorations in Indian ThoughtAlbany: Banaras Hindu University Press. Adyar Library and Research Centre. India’s Bhatts to the Study of LanguageDelhi: Classical Traditions and Contemporary Challengesvol.

Cambridge University Press, pp. American Philosophical Society, Siderits, Mark,Indian Philosophy of Language: Studies in Selected IssuesDordrecht: Interaction and ContinuityJohannes Bronkhorst ed. Titunik translatorsCambridge, MA: Wittgenstein, Ludwig,Philosophical InvestigationsG.

Kumarila | Indian dialectician, teacher, and interpreter |

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